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The United States' international trade laws strictly enforce antidumping
("AD") rules, and its antitrust laws effectively oversee private settlement
agreements. However, these two distinct, yet related, areas of law both fail
to adequately address the legality of private post-order settlement
agreements that occur in the shadows of the AD process. This Comment
investigates the legality of such settlements and reveals how domestic firms
are exploiting the overlap between AD and antitrust laws so as to
circumvent both. Being fully aware that AD administrative reviews create
costly uncertainty for foreign firms, domestic firms exploit this uncertainty
and pressure their foreign competitors into agreeing to lucrative cash
settlement agreements. Though these settlements frustrate the object and
purpose of AD laws by incentivizing unfairly priced imports, the
settlements sidestep existing AD laws and are not prohibited. Normally,
such collusive efforts to disrupt trade would create immediate antitrust
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liability, but the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, with its First Amendment
foundations, immunizes domestic firms from liability. This Comment takes
a closer look at the legal implication of these settlement agreements in both
antitrust and international trade contexts. It then suggests ways to restore
the functional effectiveness ofAD laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the United States' international trade framework, domestic
industries can exploit U.S. antidumping ("AD") laws to seek private
monetary gain, restrain trade, and harm competition.' Though this practice
is not new, it operated almost entirely in secrecy until the International
Trade Commission ("ITC") recognized its existence during a recent
investigation.2  The discovery of this practice even caused one ITC
Commissioner to proclaim, "I cannot figure out for the life of me how [this
practice is] actually legal."3 The ITC, however, lacked the jurisdiction to
1. See Kenneth J. Pierce & Robert E. DeFrancesco, The New Big Thing in Trade
Law: Post-Order Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Settlements, METRO.
CORPORATE COUNSEL. (Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com
/pdf/2006/September/05.pdf (describing a "new" international trade practice).
2. See Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-1058, USITC
Pub. 4203, at 16 (Dec. 2010) (Review) [hereinafter Chinese Furniture] (acknowledging
the existence of this practice); James R. Hagerty, Cash Softens a Trade Blow, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487040816
04576144401022132530.html.
3. Transcript of Record at 86, Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China, Inv. No.
731-TA-1058, USITC Pub. 4203 (Oct. 5, 2010) (Review) [hereinafter Transcript]
(statement of Comn'r Lane).
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address the legality of this practice.
The United States maintains a system of trade laws to facilitate
international commerce and protect domestic industries from unfair
competition.5 Specifically, AD laws strive to overcome the harmful effects
of dumping, a practice that occurs when a foreign firm sells goods in the
U.S. market at unfairly low prices. 6 To prevent these artificially low-priced
goods from affording an unfair competitive advantage to foreign firms at
the expense of domestic industries, the U.S. government assigns AD duties
to foreign goods that are dumped in the U.S. market.7
The duty rates, however, are non-permanent and are subject to annual
administrative reviews.8  These reviews create costly uncertainty for
foreign firms, and domestic industries are quick to exploit this uncertainty
by pressuring foreign firms into lucrative settlement agreements.9 Under
these agreements, those foreign producers subjected to the AD order
("subject foreign producers") make cash payments to domestic producers,
who then withdraw the petitions for administrative reviews, allowing
foreign producers to avoid the costly review process.'0
4. See Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 16-17 (asserting that the ITC need not
consider the ramifications of such settlement agreements); Simon Lester, More on Anti-
Dumping Payments, INT'L EcoN. L. & POL'Y BLOG (Feb. 21, 2011, 8:37 PM),
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2011/02/more-anti-dumping-payments.html
(explaining that both the ITC and the Department of Commerce lack jurisdiction over
the related antitrust issues).
5. See Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping
Measures Obstruct Market Competition, 87 N.C. L. REV. 357, 364-68 (2009) (detailing
the history and purpose of the U.S. trade laws and arguing that the U.S. AD regime has
a pervasive protectionist nature).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (2006); see Maurizio Zanardi, Antidumping Law as a
Collusive Device, 37 CAN. J. OF EcoN. 95, 96 (2004) (noting that dumping
determinations account for product quantity, quality, and sale circumstances).
7. Marion B. Schnerre, Antidumping, A Choice Between Unilateral Duties or
Negotiation of a Suspension Agreement, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 497, 497-98
(1994); see STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 11ITH CONG., OVERVIEW AND
COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 108 (Comm. Print 2010) (describing how AD
duties are designed to curtail the effects of international price discrimination); Cho,
supra note 5, at 370-73 (acknowledging that AD remedies are intended to stop
predatory pricing schemes, but pointing to flaws in the rationale behind AD laws).
8. See Patrick F. J. Macrory, Administration of the US. Antidumping Law by the
Department of Commerce, 722 PLI/COMM 9, 27-28 (1995) (explaining that original
duty rates and final AD liability are subject to change if the Department of Commerce
conducts an administrative review of an AD order).
9. See HARVEY KAYE & CHRISTOPHER A. DUNN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
PRACTICE § 31:4 (2011) (articulating how firms weigh the costs of uncertainty against
their duty rates and final AD liability); Cho, supra note 5, at 388 (examining how duty
rate uncertainty increases transaction costs for foreign firms).
10. See KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9 (describing settlements as "attractive options"
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These collusive settlement agreements raise important antitrust concerns
because they involve private price and quantity agreements that actively
restrain commerce, as well as efforts to use government processes for
improper purposes." However, due to retrospective AD procedures and
First Amendment exceptions to antitrust rules, these settlements are likely
permissible under both AD and antitrust laws.12 Thus, though the ITC may
be "very troubled by [such] settlement agreement[s],"l 3 an unlikely
intersection of international trade and antitrust laws allows domestic
industries to circumvent both sets of laws and thus immunize themselves
from any actionable liability.
This Comment addresses whether these private post-order settlement
agreements are, in fact, legal under existing AD and antitrust frameworks
and, if they are legal, how U.S. laws can adapt to account for these
settlements. Section II of this Comment discusses the history, purpose, and
function of U.S. AD laws. Then, it examines how the administrative
review process gives rise to private settlement agreements. Section III
analyzes whether these settlements are legal under U.S. antitrust laws and
how these settlements frustrate the object and purpose of AD laws. Finally,
Section IV recommends ways to adapt U.S. trade laws to account for these
settlement agreements. This Comment employs a recent ITC case
("Chinese furniture case") 14 as an example of how post-order AD
settlement agreements operate.
I. AD LAWS EVOLVED TO PRODUCE EFFECTIVE MEANS OF
PROTECTING DOMESTIC FIRMS FROM UNFAIR IMPORTS, AND
THESE LAWS ARE CLOSELY TIED TO ANTITRUST CONCERNS
This Section begins by exploring the history and purpose of AD laws
and how they grew in both scope and effectiveness over the last century to
build today's complex trade law regime.15  In particular, this Section
for foreign and domestic firms); Zanardi, supra note 6, at 96 (describing how domestic
producers "threaten and induce" foreign producers into agreeing to settle).
11. See KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9 (observing that private pricing agreements can
themselves be considered conspiracies in restraint of trade); Terry Calvani & Randolph
W. Tritell, Invocation of United States import relief laws as an antitrust violation, 31
ANTITRUST BULL. 527, 548 (1986) (arguing that the abuse of import relief mechanisms
violates the spirit of the Sherman Act); Schnerre, supra note 7, at 498 (outlining the
purposes of AD legislation).
12. See infra Section II.
13. Transcript, supra note 3, at 86 (statement of Comm'r Lane).
14. Chinese Furniture, supra note 2.
15. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 763 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds.,
5th ed. 2008) (noting the complex and formalized nature of modem AD rules and
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focuses on the AD administrative review process and its retrospective
method of determining final AD duty liability. Then, this Section turns to a
discussion of antitrust laws and how their regulation of private settlement
agreements creates an important juncture of AD and antitrust concerns.
Additionally, this Section introduces the Chinese furniture case as an
example to describe AD procedures.
A. The Evolving History, Purpose, and Function ofAD Laws Created
an Effective System of AD Enforcement
Congress first contemplated "dumping" in the Antidumping Act of 1916
("1916 Act"), which allowed domestic firms to bring suits against foreign
firms dumping goods in the U.S. market at less than fair value ("LTFV").'6
The elements of the 1916 statute, however, were difficult to satisfy, and
Congress introduced new AD legislation in 1921.' Though AD
mechanisms continued to strengthen, they remained largely unused until
the 1970s."
1. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 Established the Modern
International Trade Law System
Congress ushered in a new era of AD policy with the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 ("1979 Act"), which repealed the 1921 Antidumping Act.19
Since the implementation of the 1979 Act, the Department of Commerce
("Commerce") and the ITC share the responsibility of investigating and
enforcing U.S. AD laws; Commerce determines whether dumping
occurred, and the ITC determines whether the dumping caused a domestic
industry to suffer a material injury. 20 Today, American industries use AD
laws more than any other import relief mechanism. 2 1
procedures).
16. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
HANDBOOK IV-3 (13th ed. 2008) (recognizing that domestic firms could seek damages
against foreign firms in federal court under the 1916 Act).
17. See id. (suggesting that the intent requirements of the 1916 Act were especially
difficult to demonstrate).
18. Macrory, supra note 8, at 15.
19. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 16, at IV-4 (describing the 1979
Act as a codification of the GATT Antidumping Code); Macrory, supra note 8, at 15
(noting that the 1970s brought both procedural and substantive changes to U.S. AD
laws).
20. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 15, at 763-64; see U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, supra note 16, at IV-4 (explaining that Commerce took over its antidumping
administration role from the Department of the Treasury).
21. See Macrory, supra note 8, at 15 (noting that AD duties, together with
countervailing duties, are the most commonly used import relief mechanism).
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2. The Byrd Amendment Added Cash to the AD Equation
The Byrd Amendment, or Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act,
changed AD laws so that the cash from foreign firms' duty payments went
directly to the pockets of domestic firms, instead of being paid into the
federal treasury.22 Thus, "domestic interested parties" 23 had a new reason
to bring AD investigations: direct cash payments.24 Congress, however,
repealed the Byrd Amendment, effective October 1, 2007, leaving domestic
industries with a "whetted appetite for cash" and contributing to the recent
influx in cash settlement agreements.25
3. AD Laws Are Built Around the Important Purpose ofLimiting the
Harmful Effects of Unfair Imports
AD laws strive to maintain fair competition by ensuring foreign goods
are not sold at unfairly low prices in the U.S. market.26 If goods enter the
United States at unfairly low prices, foreign firms could drive domestic
firms out of the market and create barriers to keep them from reentering the
market.27  Foreign firms could then raise prices well beyond previous
market rates, and no domestic competition would exist to quell
skyrocketing prices. 28  By providing only administrative remedies, AD
laws are not designed to incentivize action by domestic firms seeking direct
duty payments; rather, the incentive is supposed to be protection from
unfair trading practices.29
22. See Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note 1 (contending that the Byrd Amendment
altered trade litigation by changing the incentives associated with bringing AD
investigations).
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) ("[P]roducers as a whole of a domestic like product, or
those producers whose collective output of a domestic like product constitutes a major
proportion of the total domestic production of the product.").
24. Id.
25. See id. (arguing that the Byrd Amendment, and its subsequent repeal, was a
primary cause of the increasing prevalence of settlement agreements). But see
JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 15, at 812 (questioning the Byrd Amendment's
association with private settlement agreements).
26. See Schnerre, supra note 7, at 497-98 (explaining that AD laws pursue a "level
playing field" for international trade).
27. See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 15, at 756-63 (providing examples
of how the AD process is supposed to function and thus further the underlying policies
of AD laws).
28. See Schnerre, supra note 7, at 497 (identifying the threat of a foreign country
gaining an unfair advantage in the domestic market as the primary incentive for
domestic industries to initiate AD cases).
29. Cf id. at 517 (explaining that AD laws no longer afford monetary damages for
domestic producers but instead incentivize domestic action by eliminating unfair
competition).
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B. The AD Process Operates Through a System ofPetitions,
Investigations, Duties, and Reviews
Under U.S. trade law, "dumping" occurs when a foreign firm sells a
good in the U.S. market at LTFV. 30 Together, Commerce and the ITC
determine whether dumping occurred and whether the dumping materially
injured domestic industries.' If both decisions are affirmative, Commerce
imposes AD duties on all imports from the subject country being unfairly
dumped in the U.S. market ("subject imports").32
When domestic interested parties believe foreign firms from a specific
country are dumping goods in the U.S. market, the domestic interested
parties can file AD petitions with Commerce and the ITC.33 Commerce
will issue an affirmative determination and calculate AD duty margins if it
finds that subject imports enter the U.S. market at LTFV.34 Then, the ITC
determines whether subject imports cause, or are likely to cause, material
injury to a domestic industry.35  If both Commerce and the ITC reach
affirmative final determinations, Commerce assigns AD duties to all
subject imports from the subject country.36 The initial duty rates, however,
are not permanent, and domestic interested parties can petition to have
37them retroactively changed to reflect the actual dumping margins.
Generally, U.S. AD law provides two primary methods for "settling" an
AD duty case during the initial investigation process: (1) a suspension
38
agreement, or (2) a withdrawal of the domestic interested party's petition.
For suspension agreements, Commerce will stop an investigation so long as
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34). See Zanardi, supra note 6, at 96 (describing dumping as
selling a product for cheaper in its own domestic market than the amount for which it is
sold in a foreign market); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 7, at
108-11 (stating that the LTFV determination involves a comparison of a foreign
good's "normal value" and its "export price" and describing how those values are
calculated).
31. See, e.g., JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 15, at 763-64.
32. See Zanardi, supra note 6, at 96 (noting AD orders require affirmative final
determinations by both Commerce and the ITC).
33. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 16, at 11-4.
34. Macrory, supra note 8, at 21.
35. Id. at 23.
36. INT'L TRADE ADMIN., IMPORT ADMINISTRATION ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, ch. 1,
subdiv. (IV)(A)(3) (last updated Oct. 13, 2009). To satisfy duties imposed by
Commerce, cash deposits, not bonds, must accompany all subject imports and must be
assessed at the estimated dumping margin. See Macrory, supra note 8, at 16, 23.
37. See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 15, at 766-67 (describing initial
duties as mere provisional estimations that can be later changed through annual
administrative reviews).
38. Macrory, supra note 8, at 24-26.
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"substantially all" foreign producers of the subject imports agree to remove
the dumped goods' harmful effects.39 Commerce's approval of a
suspension agreement is also contingent upon Commerce's determination
that a cessation of the investigation is in the public interest.4 0
Unlike suspension agreements, the cessation of AD investigations via a
withdrawal of a petition requires the domestic producers' consent.4 1 A
petitioner can stop an investigation by withdrawing an AD petition at any
point before Commerce's final determination.4 2 However, as with
suspension agreements, the ultimate cessation of the investigation depends
upon Commerce's determination that ending the investigation is in the
public interest.43
Moreover, an AD duty order can still be removed after it is put in
place.44 Both Commerce and the ITC must conduct reviews of AD orders
every five years after the publication of an AD order, and Commerce must
revoke an AD order if the agencies find that the order's termination would
not lead to a likely continuation or recurrence of dumping or material
injury.45
C. By Request, Commerce Can Reevaluate Final AD Duty Liability
Through Administrative Reviews
The margin rates assigned under original AD duty orders are non-
permanent estimates.46 If domestic interested parties want the dumping
margins and associated import duties to be retroactively adjusted, they can
39. See KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9, § 27:3 (explaining that suspension
agreements typically require foreign producers to either raise their prices or reduce
their import volume); Macrory, supra note 8, at 24-25 (detailing a step-by-step process
for AD suspension agreements).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(d)(1).
41. Macrory, supra note 8, at 24.
42. Id. at 25.
43. Id. at 24-25.
44. See id. at 22, 24, 30-31 (providing several examples for how an AD order can
be removed or revoked).
45. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c); see Macrory, supra note 8, at 30-31 (outlining Commerce
and the ITC's decision-making process as part of the "sunset review" process); see also
Five-Year ("Sunset') Review Status, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N (May 31, 2010),
http://info.usitc.gov/oinv/sunset.nsf/0a9l5ada53el92cd8525661a
0073de7d/al61c6791613f35b852567750054a793/$FILE/May%2031%202010%2OSun
status.pdf (detailing Commerce and the ITC's revocation rate under sunset reviews and
revealing that many more dumping orders are maintained than are revoked).
46. See Macrory, supra note 8 (explaining that because original margin rates are
non-permanent, foreign firms' duty payments do not necessarily represent their final
liability).
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petition Commerce for an annual administrative review of the duty rates. 4 7
Under such a review, Commerce examines the actual import data from the
previous year to determine whether the original cash deposit rate was
higher or lower than the actual dumping margin. 4 8 If there are too many
foreign firms to review individually, Commerce uses a sampling technique
to gather trade data from selected firms and uses that data to generate a
nationwide AD duty rate for those firms not investigated individually. 49
After an administrative review, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
("Customs") provides subject foreign producers with a refund if their initial
deposits were too high.50 Alternatively, if the initial deposits were too low,
Customs collects the difference.51 From then on, cash deposits assessed at
the new duty rates must accompany all subject imports.52
Requests for administrative reviews occur in a majority of AD cases.
However, if Commerce receives no requests for an administrative review,
the original estimated AD margins remain, and all subject foreign
producers continue to pay their original duty rates.54 Similarly, a domestic
producer's timely withdrawal of a petition for administrative review stops
the review process, leaving the original duty rates in place. 5
Importantly, domestic interested parties can choose which foreign
producers are included in a petition for administrative review, causing
Commerce to treat foreign producers differently during an administrative
review.56 Foreign producers not listed in a petition continue to pay their
47. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.213 (2011) (describing the administrative review
procedure as the most frequently used method of retrospectively calculating final duty
liability after goods are imported); see also Daniel Ikenson, Tony Soprano Meets the
Antidumping Law, CATO INST. (Feb. 18, 2011, 12:18 PM), http://www.cato-at-
liberty.org/tony-soprano-meets-the-antidumping-law/ (distinguishing the United States
as the only major economy to determine 'retrospectively' final AD liability).
48. 19 C.F.R. § 351.213.
49. See Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note 1 (describing Commerce's sampling of
certain "mandatory" respondents to determine actual import practice).
50. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 15, at 767; see Macrory, supra note 8, at
28-29 (indicating that Customs refunds or collects the difference between the cash
deposits paid by foreign producers and the liquidated amount, plus interest).
51. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 15, at 767.
52. Macrory, supra note 8, at 28-29.
53. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 15, at 767.
54. See Ikenson, supra note 47 (clarifying that neither domestic nor foreign
companies are required to request reviews).
55. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1) (explaining that petitions for review may be
lawfully withdrawn within ninety days and that the administrative review ceases upon a
timely withdraw of the petition, with no changes in the duty rates).
56. See Macrory, supra note 8, at 27-29 (noting that a petition for review must
specify which foreign producers to review).
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original rates, but those chosen for review face greater uncertainty about
their future liability.5 Also, domestic interested parties may choose to
withdraw only a petition for specific foreign producers while continuing
the review process against others.58
U.S. AD law does not contemplate private-to-private post-order
settlements for administrative reviews. 59 Nonetheless, these settlements are
increasingly common, and neither Commerce nor the ITC have taken a
stance on their permissibility despite, or perhaps because of, their antitrust
implications.60
D. Like AD Laws, Antitrust Laws Promote Fair Competition
That the ITC and Commerce avoid addressing the antitrust concerns
related to private post-order AD settlements does not imply that antitrust
concerns do not exist or are not worth investigating.61 Decades of court
decisions recognize that America's national economic policy centers on
faith in the value of fair competition. 62 Consequently, U.S. antitrust laws
support a general policy that fair trade is desirable.63 Alongside this broad
public interest in maintaining fair competition, courts established that there
is a legitimate state interest in identifying and regulating injurious practices
in commercial affairs.64 Therefore, to protect competition and promote
57. See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 15, at 767 (noting that requests for
review occur in fifty to sixty percent of AD cases).
58. See KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9 (providing examples of where administrative
review petitions were withdrawn for some, but not all, foreign producers).
59. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673; see also Macrory, supra note 8, at 24-46 (outlining the
statutorily provided-for settlement methods).
60. See Lester, supra note 4 (noting that the ITC and Commerce did not rule on
these settlements because they lacked proper jurisdiction); Pierce & DeFrancesco,
supra note 1 (observing the increasing prevalence of these settlements).
61. See Heath E. Combs, ITC Member Scrutinizes Settlement Agreements,
FURNITURE TODAY (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.furnituretoday.com/article/534949-
ITCmember scrutinizes settlement agreements.php (explaining that the ITC only
"sidestepped" addressing the legality of these settlements because of their antitrust
nature).
62. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (establishing, in
the immediate wake of the Sherman Act, that American economic policies rely on
principles of fair competition); see also FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 632
(1992) (maintaining that the preservation of a fair market free of price fixing or cartels
is essential to American principles of economic freedom).
63. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951)
(reiterating that antitrust legislation reflects the policy that international trade is both
possible and necessary).
64. See Alt. Pioneering Sys., Inc. v. Direct Innovative Prods., Inc., 822 F. Supp.
1437, 1445 (D. Minn. 1993) (finding a public interest in fostering open and fair
competition); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 431 (S.D.
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public and state interests, U.S. antitrust laws promote trade by suppressing
unfair attempts to hinder competition.
1. The Sherman Act Is the Primary Piece of U.S. Antitrust Legislation
at Issue in AD Cases
Generally, the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations."66 For a court to find antitrust liability under the
Sherman Act, three elements must be satisfied: (1) at least two parties must
have been acting together as a conspiracy; (2) the co-conspirators must
have intended to unreasonably restrain trade; and (3) a party must have
suffered actual injuries resulting from the restraint in trade.6 7
2. The Federal Trade Commission Act Expands upon the Sherman
Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act") prohibits unfair or
deceptive practices affecting commerce and is used to prosecute conduct
that directly violates the Sherman Act or otherwise violates the "spirit" of
U.S. antitrust laws. 6 8 The Sherman Act and the FTC Act apply to both
domestic and foreign firms that restrain either domestic or foreign
commerce. 6 9
E. Private Settlements Can Violate Antitrust Laws
Generally, private settlement agreements raise antitrust concerns when
the agreements involve implications for pricing standards or market
Ohio 1980) (holding that states have a legitimate interest in regulating commercial
affairs that restrain competition).
65. See, e.g., Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796, 801
(S.D. Cal. 1952) (accentuating the relationship between antitrust concerns, competition,
and trade).
66. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
67. See, e.g., Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d
495, 501-02 (9th Cir. 2009) (amend. July 9, 2012) (describing the three elements
necessary to state a claim under Section I of the Sherman Act); accord A Fisherman's
Best, Inc. v. Rec. Fishing Alliance, 310 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2002) (using similar
elements to establish Sherman Act liability).
68. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-45; Calvani & Tritell, supra note 11 (viewing the FTC
Act as an extension of the Sherman Act).
69. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 2-4 (Apr. 1995), available at 1995 WL
1146233. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1269
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act creates
limited Sherman Act liability for foreign conduct that harms domestic commerce).
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allocation.70 In such cases, the settlement itself may be considered a
conspiracy in restraint of trade that violates antitrust law.' For example, in
Music Center v. Prestini Musical Instrument Compiny, a foreign firm
claimed that a U.S. competitor threatened to request an AD investigation if
the foreign firm did not accept specific terms.72 Though the court did not
rule on the merits of the collusion via threat of an AD petition, it noted that
an AD settlement affecting either the price or quantity of subject imports
would violate U.S. antitrust laws.73
F. Abuse ofProcess Implications Can Heighten Antitrust Concerns
Abuse of process concerns arise when a private party uses a legal
process against another party to serve a purpose for which that process was
not designed. 7 4 The common law tort of abuse of process is closely related
to antitrust concerns because courts can impose antitrust liability upon a
party initiating a legal process to hurt its competition instead of using that
process for its legitimate and intended purposes.7 The most common
method of abuse of process in antitrust cases is some form of extortion, in
which one party uses a legal or administrative process to compel another
party to make some sort of payment or to take some specific action that it
76
would not have otherwise. Under an abuse of process standard, the
unlawful use of legal action to restrain trade can constitute anticompetitive
70. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 173, 175 (1963) (finding
Sherman Act antitrust liability for firms using collusive license agreements to disrupt a
competitive market); see also Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799,
816 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (indicating that efforts to keep competitors out of a market violate
antitrust laws).
71. See KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9, § 31:1 n.2 (observing that AD settlements
necessarily involve relative pricing schemes amongst competitors and pointing to
similar private settlement circumstances where such schemes were themselves found to
violate antitrust laws).
72. See 874 F. Supp. 543, 543, 547 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (addressing issues of unfair
trading, trade secrets, abuses of process, wrongful proceedings, and prima facie torts).
73. See Christopher T. Taylor, The Economic Effects of Withdrawn Antidumping
Investigations, FED. TRADE COMM'N 1, 2 (2001), http://www.ftc.gov/be
/workpapers/wp240.pdf (explaining the decision in Music Center). See generally
Music Center, 874 F. Supp. 543 (noting that private agreements involving price fixing,
price lists, and quantity allotments can create antitrust liability).
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977).
75. See id. § 682 cmt. b; Calvani & Tritell, supra note 11, at 532-33 (quoting
James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Government Processes, the First Amendment, and the
Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEORGETOWN L.J. 601 (1985)); see also Grip-Pak, Inc. v.
Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 471-73 (7th Cir. 1982) (using an abuse of
process analysis to propose that courts should focus more on the petitioning parties'
subjective intent to harm competition).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 cmt. b.
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conduct subject to antitrust liability.7 7
In Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., the Seventh Circuit found
that even if legal procedures have a legitimate basis in the law, such
procedures can still amount to an actionable restraint of trade because an
overt harassment of competitors via legal procedures qualifies as an abuse
of process that could violate antitrust laws. As Judge Posner explained,
for an abuse of process to be actionable under antitrust laws, it does not
have to be "malicious" in the tort sense, nor must there be a lack of
probable cause for the legal action.7 9  The court found, instead, that
antitrust concerns arise when a plaintiff does not care about the outcome of
the suit itself and is instead concerned with maintaining the suit to force a
competitor to perform some act it would not otherwise perform. 80 Though
the Supreme Court effectively overruled Grip-Pak in Professional Real
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,81 Judge
Posner's analysis established the idea that litigation supported by improper
anticompetitive purposes should not necessarily be immunized from
antitrust liability just because the claim is not entirely baseless.82
G. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Provides an Important Immunity
from Antitrust Liability
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine arose out of two Supreme Court
decisions as a judicially created means of exemption from antitrust liability
for most lawful attempts to obtain government action.83  The First
77. See Scooter Store, Inc. v. SpinLife.com, LLC, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1116
(S.D. Ohio 2011) (holding that a firm using trademark litigation to destroy competition
was engaged in anticompetitive conduct); see also Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky
Mountain Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1251 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the
intentional harassment of competitors through administrative processes creates the
same antitrust liabilities as harassing competitors through the judicial system).
78. See Grip-Pak, Inc., 694 F.2d at 471-72 (insisting that the defendant's suit was
not necessarily barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine simply because the suit was
non-malicious).
79. Id.
80. See id at 472 (noting the difficulty of drawing lines between lawful and
unlawful competitive purposes in filing a suit).
81. See generally Prof I Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (discussing that a plaintiffs subjective intent was not relevant
in an antitrust case involving otherwise lawful litigation unless the plaintiffs suit was
first found to be objectively unreasonable).
82. See Grip-Pak Inc., 694 F.2d at 471 ("If abuse of process is not constitutionally
protected, no more should litigation that has an improper anticompetitive purpose be
protected, even though the plaintiff has a colorable claim.").
83. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); see also
Thomas J. Prusa, Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn?, 33 J. INT'L
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Amendment strongly influenced the doctrine's limitations on antitrust
liability. 84 Under this doctrine, as long as a private party petitions the
government for a lawful form of redress, that party is exempted from
antitrust scrutiny, even if the petitioned-for government action might harm
competition.85  Noerr-Pennington protection extends to cover private
parties' petitions that result in settlement agreements between the
petitioning parties and the government.86
When assessing the scope of Noerr-Pennington's antitrust liability
protection, courts look at the impact, source, context, and nature of the
anticompetitive activity at issue.8 7  However, even if the underlying
purpose of the activity is to achieve an anticompetitive restraint of trade,
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes that activity from antitrust
liability so long as it is a lawful solicitation of government action.
Though many courts hold that a petitioner's "bad intent or anticompetitive
motivation" in seeking government action is "irrelevant" for purposes of
Noerr-Pennington protection, others question this reasoning.
EcoN. 1, 6-7 (1992) (describing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's origins).
84. E.g., Grip-Pak, Inc., 694 F.2d at 471; see Prusa, supra note 83, at 6-7
(clarifying that under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, antitrust liability is subordinate to
the constitutionally protected right to petition any branch or department of government,
or otherwise participate in the legislative process).
85. See Cho, supra note 5, at 361 (explaining that any anticompetitive effects of a
lawful petition are irrelevant for Noerr-Pennington purposes).
86. See VIBO Corp., v. Conway, 669 F.3d 675, 683-84 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining
that the actions protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine include settling with the
government, but making no mention of private-to-private settlement agreements). But
cf Cho, supra note 5, at 361 (arguing that courts interpret the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine so narrowly that its protections would probably extend to cover private AD
settlements).
87. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 504
(1988).
88. See Freeman v. Lasky, 410 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that
"conduct incidental to" a petition is still protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine so
long as the petition itself would be protected); Marina v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 197 (3rd
Cir. 2003) (emphasizing that Noerr-Pennington immunity protects lawful petitioning of
government regardless of improper motives); Grip-Pak, Inc., 694 F.2d at 471 (asserting
that the Noerr Court viewed collective efforts to influence legislation as a form of
petitioning, regardless of their purpose).
89. Compare Assoc. Container Transp. Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 58-59
(2d Cir. 1983) (stating that lawful efforts to influence government are immune from
Sherman Act liability regardless of anticompetitive purposes), and VIBO Corp., 669
F.3d at 684 (holding that subjective anticompetitive intent is irrelevant in Noerr-
Pennington determinations), with Grip-Pak, Inc., 694 F.2d at 471-72 (proposing that
subjective intent should be given more consideration in Noerr-Pennington decisions).
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H. Shams: An Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Rule
Noerr-Pennington immunity is not absolute because courts created a
'sham' exception, which removes the doctrine's protection for 'sham'
petitions that are solely intended to hurt competition.90 Specifically, the
sham exception applies when parties use a governmental process itself,
instead of the outcome of that process, as an anticompetitive weapon.91
Traditionally, courts use a two-prong test to determine whether a petition
for lawful governmental action qualifies as a sham: (1) the petition must be
objectively baseless; and (2) the petitioner's subjective motivation must be
to conceal its intent to use the governmental process for anticompetitive
purposes.92 If both prongs are satisfied, courts will not afford petitioners
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's antitrust immunity.93
Some courts characterize the use of sham actions as a form of "abuse of
process." 94 For instance, Justice Stevens, in his Professional Real Estate
Investors concurrence, recognized that many sham cases involve an abuse
of process, and he argued that the distinction between sham and genuine
litigation should not be the only difference between lawful and unlawful
conduct.95 As Justice Stevens explained, the sham exception's objective
90. Cho, supra note 5, at 361. See generally Prof I Real Estate Investors, Inc., v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (applying the sham exception).
91. See VIBO Corp., 669 F.3d at 685-86 (differentiating between using a lawful
process itself and the outcome of a process to harm competitors); In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 401 (2nd Cir. 2005) (insisting that Noerr-
Pennington immunity applies when an anticompetitive effect is a consequence of some
governmental action, but not the means for obtaining such action); Winterland
Concessions Co. v. Trela, 735 F.2d 257, 263-64 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting Gainsville v.
Florida Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 1265-66 (S.D. Fla. 1980)) ("[T]he
prerequisite motive for the sham exception is the intent to harm one's competitors not
by the result of the litigation but by the simple fact of the institution of the litigation."
(emphasis maintained)).
92. See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 60-61 (1993) (establishing
the two-prong test for defining sham litigation under Noerr-Pennington, holding that
courts must satisfy the first prong-that the petition was objectively baseless-before
examining a petitioner's subjective intent, and explaining that objectively baseless
petitions occur if a petition has no reasonable expectation of success on its merits).
93. See Calvani & Tritell, supra note 11, at 536-37 (using a hypothetical situation
to explain how courts conduct Noerr-Penning sham analyses).
94. See Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d
1240, 1259 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that some form of abuse of process must be found
in order to invoke the sham exception); Grip-Pak, Inc., 694 F.2d at 471-72 (comparing
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to the tort of abuse of process and applying abuse of
process standards to show that litigation can be improper even if it is supported by
probable cause); Ad Visor, Inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 640 F.2d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir.
1981) (examining Noerr-Pennington case law and characterizing courts' sham
exception analyses as tests for an abuse of process).
95. See Prof'1 Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 75-76 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
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reasonableness test may not be appropriate for determining the lawfulness
of a petition in complicated antitrust cases involving an abuse of process.96
Judge Posner, in Grip-Pak, partially inspired Justice Stevens's reasoning
by questioning other courts' use of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to grant
antitrust immunity to parties petitioning the government for purely
anticompetitive purposes. Employing an abuse of process analysis, Judge
Posner reasoned that if Noerr-Pennington immunity is applied too
broadly-to the point that all non-malicious litigation is immunized from
government regulation-the tort of abuse of process will itself become
unconstitutional.98  Judge Posner further noted that the language
surrounding abuse of process laws precisely embodies the types of legal
activity that courts usually do not protect under the First Amendment.9 9
Other courts offer varying interpretations on the scope of the Noerr-
Pennington sham exception.' o For instance, the court in Music Center
held that a domestic firm's filing of multiple AD and administrative review
petitions against its foreign competitors did not qualify as a sham activity
because there was no evidence that the domestic firm lacked a reasonable
expectation of success on the merits of its petition.' Additionally, three
U.S. courts of appeals require that shams be legally unreasonable, others
hold that no successful litigation can be a sham, and still other courts of
appeals consider some meritorious litigation to be a sham.102
concurring) (providing examples of how objectively reasonable lawsuits can still
violate antitrust laws).
96. See id. at 74-76 (building upon the abuse of process analysis in Grip-Pak,
disagreeing with the majority's equation of objective baselessness, and encouraging the
Court to avoid making unnecessarily broad holdings in complicated sham exception
cases).
97. See Grip-Pak, Inc., 694 F.2d at 470-71 (evaluating whether a lack of probable
cause is necessary to create actionable antitrust liability).
98. See id. at 471 (examining the Supreme Court's analysis in California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)).
99. Id.
100. Prof'I Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 55 n.3 (1993) (explaining how
the various courts of appeals apply different standards in their Noerr-Pennington sham
analyses).
101. See Music Center S.N.C. Di Luciano Pisoni & Co. v. Prestini Musical
Instruments Corp., 874 F. Supp. 543, 549-50, 554-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that
the domestic firm would be immune from liability, even if the sole purpose of its
petition was to injure a foreign competitor).
102. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 55 n.3 (1993) (acknowledging
various courts of appeals' inconsistent and often contradictory definitions of "sham"
litigation).
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I. The Chinese Furniture Case Reveals How AD Investigations
Actually Operate
In October 2003, an ad hoc association of twenty-seven U.S. furniture
producers filed AD petitions with Commerce and the ITC concerning
imports of certain wooden bedroom furniture from China.'0 3 After a full
investigation, Commerce made an affirmative determination, finding that
wooden bedroom furniture imports from China were being dumped in the
U.S. market at LTFV.104 The ITC found that the LTFV imports of Chinese
furniture materially injured the domestic wooden furniture industry. 05
Commerce issued an AD order with respect to imports of certain wooden
bedroom furniture from China on January 4, 2005.106 From then on, cash
deposits accompanied all imports of wooden bedroom furniture from
China. Commerce assigned different cash deposit rates to Chinese
furniture producers depending on their estimated dumping margins, but
because so many Chinese producers were included in the investigation,
Commerce applied its sampling procedure; thus, some producers received
lower individualized rates, but most Chinese producers received the much
higher "China-wide" duty rate.'0 8
By the ITC's first sunset review of the orders in December 2009,
Commerce had already completed four administrative reviews, with a fifth
review pending. 109 When choosing which Chinese producers to review, the
domestic interested parties petitioned for reviews of nearly every Chinese
producer with relatively low deposit rates.1 10 For the firms not listed in the
103. See Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 1-2 & n.6.
104. Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Wooden Bedroom
Furniture From the People's Republic of China, 69 Fed. Reg. 67, 313 (Dep't of
Commerce Nov. 17, 2004); Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 1-2.
105. Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China, 69 Fed. Reg. 77, 779 (Int'l Trade
Comm'n Dec. 28, 2004); Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 1-2.
106. Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and
Antidumping Duty Order: Wooden Bedroom Furniture From the People's Republic of
China, 70 Fed. Reg. 329 (Int'l Trade Admin. Jan. 4, 2005).
107. See generally Chinese Furniture, supra note 2 (describing the history of the AD
orders on certain wooden bedroom furniture from China and the associated duty
payments).
108. See Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at tbl. 1-2 (displaying the various margins
assigned to specific Chinese furniture producers, ranging between 0.4% and 39.46% as
well as the "PRC-Wide Rate" of 216.01% that was assigned to the majority of Chinese
producers under Commerce's sampling procedures).
109. Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 1-8 to 1-10, app. E.
110. See Posthearing Brief of Guandong Furniture Ass'n at 10, Wooden Bedroom
Furniture from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-1058, USITC Pub. 4203 (Dec. 2010) (Review)
(revealing that, on average, domestic interested parties requested reviews of 158
Chinese producers in each administrative review petition).
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petitions for review, Commerce automatically applied the duty rates
assessed from the original investigation or the previous administrative
reviews."' For firms listed in the petitions, Commerce investigated the
past years' import data and calculated new dumping margins.11 2 Every
year, however, most Chinese producers reached settlement agreements with
the domestic interested parties, and the domestic parties removed every
Chinese producer that settled from the petition for review." 3
II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW PROCESS INCENTIVIZES
QUESTIONABLY LEGAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS THAT
FRUSTRATE THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF EXISTING AD LAWS
This Section explores how the inherent uncertainty of AD administrative
reviews creates a system in which domestic firms can pressure their foreign
competitors into post-order settlement agreements that put cash in the
pockets of domestic producers. This Section then analyzes how these
collusive settlements generate important antitrust concerns that are,
however, likely mitigated by insufficiently particular AD laws and courts'
narrow application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. This Section also
describes how, antitrust legality notwithstanding, these settlements run
afoul of the intended goals of AD orders and frustrate the object and
purpose of existing AD legislation.
A. Through Uncertainty, the Administrative Review Process Opens
the Door to Cash Settlement Payments
Under the United States' unique retrospective AD duty assessment
system, subject foreign producers begin paying AD duties immediately
after affirmative final determinations by Commerce and the ITC, but their
final liability is often unknown for more than another year.'1 4 Thus, the
real sting of an AD order is in the inherent uncertainty of the hard-to-
predict final duty liability because the opaque administrative review
process may ultimately require foreign producers to retroactively pay much
higher duty rates. 15
Commerce's AD investigations and administrative reviews are,
111. See Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 1-8 n.14.
112. Id. at I-8 n.14,I-9.
113. Id. at 16,111-2,111-3.
114. See Ikenson, supra note 47 (noting that final liability determinations may be
delayed for as long as eighteen months, or even, sometimes, for several years).
115. See AFMC's Answers to Commissioners' Questions at 41, Wooden Bedroom
Furniture from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-1058 (Dec. 2010) (Review) (arguing that final
liability uncertainty harms foreign producers by raising their transaction costs).
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therefore, extremely costly for foreign producers-often generating
millions of dollars in legal fees-and their outcomes are difficult to
predict." 6  This is especially true when domestic parties petition for
reviews of many foreign firms, causing Commerce to employ its sampling
techniques to determine dumping margins."' 7 In addition to the upfront
legal fees and costs of satisfying the administrative review requirements,
subject foreign producers face costly uncertainty over their ultimate AD
duty liabilities." 8  Domestic interested parties use this heightened
uncertainty to pressure foreign producers into accepting collusive
settlement agreements." 9  The burden of administrative reviews'
unpredictable costs is so large that the mere threat of a review petition often
causes subject foreign producers to settle.120
When settling, domestic interested parties and subject foreign producers
work out a system in which the foreign producers that agree to make cash
payments to domestic producers are removed from the administrative
review petition; thus, those foreign producers retain their prior, and thus
predictable, duty rates. 121 These agreements are especially effective
because domestic interested parties target foreign producers paying
relatively low duty rates and who thus are especially fearful of the much
higher country-wide duty rates.122
At first, it may seem that domestic interested parties would not pursue
such agreements because they do nothing to curtail the harmful effects of
dumped subject foreign imports; however, these agreements do provide
domestic interested parties with something that past trade laws conditioned
them to associate with AD orders-cash.12 3 Congress's repeal of the Byrd
116. KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9; Cho, supra note 5, at 388.
117. See Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note 1 (detailing how the broad spectrum of
firms included in the sampling process makes it more difficult to predict what new duty
rates might be).
118. KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9.
119. See id., supra note 9 (describing how domestic producers consciously leverage
the heightened uncertainty of administrative reviews to encourage settlements and how
foreign producers view their original deposits as 'sunk costs' that they weigh against
the uncertainty of administrative reviews).
120. See B. Peter Rosendorff, Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping
Procedures, and Domestic Politics, 86 Am. EcoN. REv. 544, 544-45 (1996) (observing
that petitions for review are withdrawn for nearly one-third of all subject foreign
producers in AD cases, and nearly every withdrawal is associated with a private
settlement agreement). Cf Cho, supra note 5, at 396 (describing the uncertainty costs
of non-price predation).
121. Ikenson, supra note 47; Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note 1.
122. See INT'L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 36, at 4; Hagerty, supra note 2.
123. See Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note 1 (noting that, because of the Byrd
Amendment, domestic producers grew accustomed to receiving cash from AD orders).
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Amendment forced domestic industries to look elsewhere for easy cash.
Their solution? Private settlement agreements.12 4
Overall, four key factors enable these private post-order settlement
agreements: (1) relatively low AD rates that exporters do not want to see
increase; (2) annual petitions for review of nearly every subject foreign
producer; (3) Commerce's use of sampling to assign duty rates; and (4) the
absence of Byrd Amendment payouts.12 5
1. The Chinese Furniture Case Reveals the Full Extent and Effects of
These Settlements
The Chinese furniture case demonstrates how AD rules and procedures
enable private post-order settlement agreements and reveals the full extent
and effects of these settlements. Every year after Commerce issued the
original AD duty order, the domestic furniture industry took advantage of
Commerce's administrative review system and submitted petitions for the
review of hundreds of Chinese furniture producers.12 6  The domestic
industry used those petitions to induce Chinese producers to enter into
lucrative settlement agreements in which the domestic industry removed
Chinese producers from the petition if they agreed to pay cash to the
domestic producers.' 2 7  Knowing that many Chinese producers could
tolerate their current rates and would like to avoid paying the much higher
China-wide duty rate, the domestic producers conveyed to the Chinese
producers that the petitions would be withdrawn if they agreed to pay off
the domestic producers.12 8 This extortive process was so effective that
124. See id. (pointing to the repeal of the Byrd Amendment as an incentive for AD
settlement agreements).
125. Id.
126. See Prehearing Brief of Dalian Haufeng Furniture Group at 9, Wooden
Bedroom Furniture from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-1058, USITC Pub. 4203 (Dec. 2010)
(Review) (describing the domestic furniture industry as "strategic" and "coordinated"
in their efforts to compel settlements with Chinese competitors).
127. See id. (describing these settlements as a "reward" for the Chinese producers
willing to either enter into exclusive trading arrangements with domestic producers or
make settlement payments, and, in contrast, describing the review process as a
punishment for those Chinese producers refusing to settle); see also Posthearing Brief
of Guandong Yihua Timber Industry Co., Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China, Inv.
No. 731-TA-1058, USITC Pub. 4203, at 10-11 (Dec. 2010) (Review) (providing a first
hand account of how domestic furniture producers refused to remove one company
from an administrative review petition because it would not settle; thus, that company
was selected as a mandatory respondent and subjected to higher rates).
128. See Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America at 3-4, Wooden
Bedroom Furniture from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-1058, USITC Pub. 4203 (Dec. 2010)
(Review) (explaining that domestic furniture producers "let it be known" that they
would withdraw administrative review petitions, effectively preserving original duty
rates of 7.24% or less, for Chinese producers willing to meet the domestic petitioners
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within five years of the original order, a majority of Chinese furniture
producers chose to settle with domestic producers.12 9  Over that time,
Chinese furniture producers paid tens of millions of dollars to twenty
domestic furniture producers in exchange for removing their names from
the petitions for review.'30
Domestic producers carefully calculated the size of each Chinese
producers' settlement payments as a percentage of the value of each
producers' imports.13 1  This incentivized domestic interested parties to
encourage more subject imports because higher import volumes meant
even larger settlement payments.13 2 This calculation method, however, was
not strictly standardized, and some Chinese furniture producers received
discounted settlements because of their special commercial relationships
with domestic producers.13 3
B. These Increasingly Common Private Post-Order Settlements Raise
Far-Reaching Legal Concerns
Though the ITC only recently recognized the existence of these
settlements, economists long suspected that withdrawals of AD petitions
settlement terms); Ikenson, supra note 47 (describing the domestic industry's
exploitation of those Chinese producers that could tolerate the duties they were already
paying as "clever shakedowns"); see also Transcript, supra note 3, at 196 (Leslie
Thompson, owner of an American furniture firm with production facilities in China,
recounting a conversation with an attorney for the domestic interested parties where he
"asked [her] what [she] could give him that would entice his client, the Petitioners, to
drop [her firm] from the review"); Ellen Croibier, From China, an end run around U.S.
tariffs, TRADEREFORM.ORG (May 23, 2011), http://www.tradereform.org/2011
/05/6233/ (noting that once Chinese producers paid the domestic firms, they were
dropped from the review petitions).
129. See Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 111-2, 111-3; Posthearing Brief of
Guandong Furniture Ass'n, supra note 110, at 10 (revealing that domestic interested
parties withdrew fifty-one percent of subject Chinese producers from the first review
petitions, seventy-nine percent from the second review, ninety-one percent from the
third review, and eighty-nine percent from the fourth review, and all withdrawals were
made in exchange for making cash payments to the domestic producers).
130. Posthearing Public Report to Commission at 111-10, Wooden Bedroom
Furniture from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-1058, USITC Pub. 4203 (Dec. 2010) (Review).
Cf Ikenson, supra note 47 (noting that an even larger, unspecified amount of money
was paid directly to the domestic interested parties' attorneys).
131. See Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America, supra note 128, at 4, 7
(reflecting the understanding of the Furniture Retailers of America after their
investigation of Commerce's import data and specific annual settlement amounts).
132. See id. at 7 (describing the "perverse incentives" produced by the order and
how these settlements allowed domestic producers to increase their profit without re-
employing any workers to curtail the harmful effects of subject imports).
133. See id. at 63 (claiming domestic firms use special commercial relationships to
effectively regulate import volumes).
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signaled some type of collusive agreement between domestic and foreign
producers.134 Those economists were largely correct because the settling of
administrative reviews is not new, and the prevalence of private post-order
settlement agreements is growing rapidly.13 5 Notably, in every recent AD
case involving post-order settlement agreements, the domestic interested
parties represented such sufficiently aligned interests that the domestic
industry could speak with one voice and control the process of submitting
and withdrawing the petitions for review; it is not clear whether this
settlement scheme will work if domestic interested parties are unorganized
or divided in their goals or motives.1 36
1. The Collusive Nature of These Settlements Raises Many Antitrust
Concerns
Fair competition is a central tenant of U.S. economic policy, and U.S.
antitrust laws support this policy by protecting both domestic and foreign
competition.137  Therefore, actions that encourage unfair trade or disrupt
market competition raise serious antitrust concerns.'3 8  U.S. trade law
accounts for two primary methods of settling AD cases, and Commerce
must oversee both methods. 13 9 In contrast, private post-order settlements
are conducted without any agency oversight.14 0 Without agency oversight,
any discussion of price or quantity restraints runs significant risks of
134. Cho, supra note 5, at 394; see Combs, supra note 61 (noting that although the
ITC formally recognized the settlement process in the furniture case, Commerce
continues to deny knowledge of their existence).
135. See Ikenson, supra note 47 (explaining that these agreements operated "in the
shadows" for years). Cf Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note 1 (tracing the rise of these
settlements back to the Byrd Amendment and its repeal).
136. See Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note 1 (questioning whether these settlement
schemes will be as effective if domestic industries are less organized); see also KAYE &
DUNN, supra note 9 (noting that no public or private party has yet challenged these
post-order AD settlement agreements in court).
137. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (establishing that
American economic policy relies on principles of fair competition); Balian Ice Cream
Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (connecting antitrust
concerns with fair trading practices).
138. See Calvani & Tritell, supra note 11, at 530-31 (illustrating how the most
pressing issues arise when private AD settlement agreements bring about collusive
outcomes because antitrust violations are "unavoidable" when domestic and foreign
firms act together to restrain trade).
139. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(d)(1) (establishing a public interest requirement for
suspending an AD investigation); Macrory, supra note 8, at 24-25 (explaining that
suspension agreements and AD petition withdrawals both require Commerce's
approval before AD cases can be 'settled').
140. KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9.
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violating antitrust laws.141
The most prominent piece of antitrust legislation at issue is the Sherman
Act, which explicitly prohibits collusive acts that restrain trade or harm
competition.142 Post-order AD settlement agreements run afoul of the three
central elements of the Sherman Act.143 First, the Sherman Act's contract,
combination, or conspiracy element is easily satisfied: because these
settlements involve direct agreement and cooperation amongst foreign and
domestic industries, and each of those industries is comprised of multiple
firms, there are almost always multiple parties acting together to restrain
trade.144 Second, the restraint of trade or commerce element is satisfied
because these private settlement agreements usually involve some type of
relative pricing or quantity agreement amongst market participants.14 5
Finally, the restraints on trade caused by the post-order settlements
inflict actual injuries on certain foreign and domestic competitors,
satisfying the final element for antitrust liability under the Sherman Act.146
Domestic producers not participating in the AD case suffer because they do
141. Cf KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9 (recounting how, in an AD case involving a
private settlement agreement, there were no antitrust concerns because neither the
negotiations nor the agreement involved any market price or quantity restrictions).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
143. See Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495,
501-02 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing the three primary requirements for stating a claim
under the Sherman Act: the existence of a conspiracy, intent to restrain trade, and
actual injury to competition or trade).
144. See A Fisherman's Best, Inc. v. Rec. Fishing Alliance, 310 F.3d 183, 189 (4th
Cir. 2002) (explaining that for success on a claim alleging violations of the Sherman
Act, a plaintiff must show that two persons acted in concert and that their actions
constituted an unreasonable restraint on commerce); Calvani & Tritell, supra note 11,
at 546 (clarifying that, under the Sherman Act, there cannot not be an antitrust violation
if a single firm petitions the government in an effort to restrain trade or commerce
because there could not possibly be two or more actors joined under a contract,
combination, or conspiracy); Cho, supra note 5, at 398 (noting that multiple domestic
firms discuss prices and costs among themselves when filing AD petitions because the
petitions must be filed by a representative number of domestic producers of like
products).
145. See Music Center v. Prestini Musical Instrument Company, 874 F. Supp. 543,
557 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that price fixing in order to control market access
violates antitrust laws); KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9 (noting that AD settlements raise
antitrust concerns because they involve relative pricing agreements amongst market
participants and explaining that when private settlement agreements involve
implications for pricing standards or market allocation, the settlement itself may be
considered a conspiracy in restraint of trade); see also Taylor, supra note 73, at 3
(claiming that, though there is little precedent, a private AD settlement attempting to
increase prices or decrease imports, absent some sort of joint venture, is illegal).
146. See, e.g., Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc., 611 F.3d at 501-02 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that, to establish Sherman Act liability, a party must suffer actual
injuries resulting from the restraint in trade).
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not receive the cash payouts, and the settlement agreements do nothing to
limit the flow of unfair subject imports, which continue to injure the sales
of their goods in the U.S. market.14 7 Moreover, foreign producers with
special relationships with the domestic petitioners receive better settlement
terms; this effectively raises the relative costs for the foreign producers that
receive the relatively less favorable terms by limiting their ability to
compete in the U.S. market.'4 8
Expanding upon the Sherman Act, the FTC Act raises additional antitrust
concerns by imposing antitrust liability on conduct that "violates the spirit"
of the Sherman Act.14 9 The use of AD settlements to restrain trade violates
the "spirit" of the Sherman Act because these settlements represent
intentional and collusive efforts to harm competitors and restrain commerce
in exchange for economic benefits.150  This effect epitomizes the exact
opposite of the Sherman Act's intended purpose of promoting competition
and prohibiting collusive acts that restrain trade.' 5'
In addition to straightforward Sherman Act or FTC Act violations, these
settlements may create additional liability as an abuse of process.152
Generally, an abuse of process occurs when a private actor uses a legal
process, against another party, primarily to accomplish a purpose for which
147. See Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 29 (Additional Views of Comm'r
Daniel R. Pearson) (analyzing the AD order's effects and how the volume of subject
Chinese furniture imports remained substantial, in both absolute terms and in terms of
relative market share).
148. See Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America, supra note 128, at 7,
63 (connecting some foreign firms' relatively lower settlement rates with special
business relationships); JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 15, at 767-68
(affirming that administrative reviews cause foreign producers to face heightened, and
costly, uncertainty); see also United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 193-95
(1963) (finding that collusive efforts to treat specific foreign competitors differently, in
order to hurt those competitors' imports to the United States, violated the Sherman
Act).
149. See Calvani & Tritell, supra note 11, at 548-50 (citing Grand Union Co. v.
FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962)) (explaining that the FTC Act prohibits unfair or
deceptive methods of competition or practices affecting commerce).
150. Id. (arguing that the abuse of import relief mechanisms frustrates the intended
purpose of the Sherman Act).
151. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 247-50 (1951) (looking to
congressional intent surrounding the Sherman Act, and other antitrust laws, to
determine that the purpose of antitrust laws is the protection of fair trade and
competition).
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 cmt. b (finding that the most
common instances of abuse of process, as it relates to antitrust concerns, arise in cases
of extortion where one party uses a lawful governmental process to unlawfully pressure
its competitors into making some sort of debt payment or partaking in some specific
action).
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that process was not designed.'5 3  The intended purpose of the
administrative review process is not to transfer wealth from foreign to
domestic producers.15 4 Rather, the review process is supposed to further
the goals of AD laws in general; for example, to protect domestic industries
from unfair import competition.155  The domestic industries' use of
administrative reviews to pressure foreign competitors into lucrative
settlement agreements is thus not a purpose that the review process was
intended to achieve, especially since the repeal of the Byrd Amendment
revealed Congress's intent to keep AD duty revenues out of the hands of
domestic industries.1 56  The review process is supposed to help protect
domestic industries, but both domestic production volume and employment
decrease after these settlements transpire; thus, the agreements fail to
further a primary goal of the administrative review process. 57
Admittedly, domestic interested parties are well within their rights to file
administrative review petitions in most AD cases.' 58  However, as Judge
Posner proposed in Grip-Pak, the use of a legal process does not have to be
"malicious" in order to violate antitrust laws, and the use of legal
procedures to harass competitors can qualify as an abuse of process that
153. See id. §682.
154. See Lester, supra note 4 (explaining that the repeal of the Byrd Amendment
raises antitrust concerns because domestic producers are not supposed to receive AD
duty payments anymore, but through private settlements domestic producers found a
way to do what Congress tried to stop).
155. Schnerre, supra note 7, at 497-98.
156. See Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note 1 (claiming that the Byrd Amendment's
repeal incentivized these settlement agreements); Schnerre, supra note 7, at 498
(explaining that AD laws only provide administrative remedies and are thus not
designed to facilitate direct payments to domestic parties); see also Prehearing Brief of
Guandong Furniture Ass'n at 5-6, Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China, Inv. No.
731-TA-1058, USITC Pub. 4203 (Dec. 2010) (Review) (noting that even under the
Byrd Amendment, domestic producers were only entitled to AD duty funds through
some government action). But cf Tudor N. Rus, Recent Development, The Short,
Unhappy Life of the Byrd Amendment, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 427, 434-38
(2007) (arguing that international pressure and the WTO played a large part in causing
Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment).
157. See Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 29 (observing the failure of the
settlement agreements to improve domestic performance indicators). Moreover, the
payments from foreign competitors were only distributed amongst a certain subset of
domestic producers, and the domestic industry did not use the funds in an effort to
offset the harmful effects of the subject imports. See id.; see also Croibier, supra note
128 (reporting that, in the Chinese Furniture case, the U.S. furniture industry lost jobs
at an even faster rate after the settlements began).
158. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.213 (showing that domestic parties may have valid
interests in petitioning for administrative reviews and explaining the rules for
implementing such reviews).
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violates antitrust laws.15 9 Judge Posner maintained that, even if there is
probable cause for pursuing the legal action, petitioning parties could still
violate antitrust laws if those parties are not actually concerned with
winning a favorable judgment but instead are concerned with harassing
competitors.160 In private administrative review settlements, domestic
interested parties are not necessarily concerned about the outcomes of the
reviews because, even if the review decisions are not in their favor, they
still receive some protection from subject imports because the original AD
orders are not removed.161 Instead, domestic parties are more concerned
with using the threat of a costly review process to compel foreign
competitors into settling because domestic producers are seeking the cash
they grew accustomed to under the Byrd Amendment. 62
2. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Probably Stands in the Way of
Antitrust Liability
Though post-order settlements of AD cases raise many antitrust
concerns, 163 these settlements are likely protected from antitrust liability by
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.' 6 4  Under this doctrine, a private party
petitioning the government for some lawful action is generally exempted
from antitrust scrutiny, even if the petition acts to restrain commerce.' 65 In
AD cases, a petition for an administrative review is a lawful action, and
domestic interested parties may lawfully pick which foreign firms to
include in the review.1 6 6 Moreover, domestic interested parties' withdrawal
of a review petition within ninety days is also a lawful action.167 Thus,
petitioning for administrative reviews is lawful under AD law and likely
159. See Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472-73 (7th Cir.
1982) (referring to the "malicious" requirement for the common law tort of abuse of
process).
160. See id. (claiming that a majority of court decisions on the topic support such an
opinion).
161. See Macrory, supra note 8, at 30-31 (describing the sunset review process, not
administrative reviews, as the means by which AD orders can be removed). Cf Prusa,
supra note 83, at 7 (observing the special role of domestic parties in the administrative
review process and proposing that they use their role with the explicit intent to obtain a
settlement offer).
162. See Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note 1 (tracing the domestic parties'
motivations for AD settlements to the Byrd Amendment).
163. See infra Section II.B.l.
164. See, e.g., Prusa, supra note 83 (proposing that AD settlements are protected by
Noerr-Pennington immunity).
165. See Cho, supra note 5, at 361 (insisting that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
obstructs the Federal Trade Commission's antitrust regulation of trade remedies).
166. See Macrory, supra note 8, at 27-29.
167. 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)(1).
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enjoys Noerr-Pennington immunity.
Many courts strictly uphold Noerr-Pennington immunity, even if the
petitioning party was motivated by anticompetitive purposes designed to
restrain trade. 168  Such a narrow application of the doctrine essentially
allows domestic producers to use the administrative review process to
extort foreign competitors without any threat of antitrust liability because
the doctrine exempts the domestic producers' lawful attempts to obtain
government action from any antitrust liability.16 9
However, domestic interested parties do not necessarily enjoy absolute
protection from antitrust liability because of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine's "sham" exception. 170  Generally, courts invoke the sham
exception in situations where parties use a governmental process itself, and
not the outcome of that process, as an anticompetitive weapon.17 1 Because
courts vary in their application of the Noerr-Pennington sham exception, it
is not clear whether AD administrative review petitions filed in an attempt
to compel private settlement agreements qualify as a sham for Noerr-
Pennington purposes.172
Generally, to qualify as a sham, an administrative review petition must
fulfill both elements of the two-prong test courts traditionally use to
evaluate whether an action falls under the Noerr-Pennington sham
exception.173  First, a court must determine whether the petition was
objectively baseless.174 A petition for administrative review is considered
objectively baseless if a court finds that an objective petitioner could not
168. See Cho, supra note 5, at 361 (reasoning that courts' narrow interpretation of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's sole exception would make that exception ineffective
in AD cases); Associated Container Transp. Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 58-59
(2d Cir. 1983) (considering petitioning parties' subjective motivations to be irrelevant
for Noerr-Pennington purposes).
169. See Prusa, supra note 83 (suggesting that Noerr-Pennington protection
effectively provides domestic parties with a "right" to pursue or attain private
settlement agreements).
170. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 5, at 361 (describing the sham exception as a
limitation on the Noerr-Pennington immunity).
171. See, e.g., VIBO Corp., Inc. v. Conway, 669 F.3d 675, 684-85 (6th Cir. 2012);
Knology, Inc. v. Insight Commc'n Co., 393 F.3d 656, 658-59 (6th Cir. 2004). Cf
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972) ("If the
end result is unlawful, it matters not that the means used in violation may be lawful.").
172. See Prof 1 Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508
U.S. 49, 55 n.3 (1993) (observing that several courts of appeals demand that an alleged
sham be legally unreasonable, other courts hold that successful litigation by definition
cannot be a sham, and still other courts of appeals sometimes consider certain
meritorious litigation to be a sham).
173. See id. at 60-61 (establishing the two-prong test).
174. Id. at 60.
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reasonably expect the petition to be successful on its merits.'7 Then, if a
court somehow finds an administrative review petition to be objectively
baseless, it could apply the second prong and assess the petitioners'
subjective motivations to use the administrative review to harm foreign
competitors. 17 6 It would be difficult to show that an AD administrative
review petition is objectively baseless because it is difficult to predict the
outcome of an administrative review; thus, it would be difficult to prove
that a petitioner could not expect at least a reasonable chance of success.17
Though the first prong makes it difficult for post-order settlement
agreements to escape Noerr-Pennington immunity, some courts show
movement away from a strict application of the sham exception test by
incorporating an abuse of process analysis in Noerr-Pennington decisions,
potentially making it easier to overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity.
Applying Justice Stevens's reasoning in Professional Real Estate Investors,
the sham exception's first prong test of objective reasonableness might not
be appropriate for determining whether the domestic parties should be
subjected to antitrust liability because it is too difficult to effectively apply
the first prong in complicated abuse of process situations.' 79 In Grip-Pak,
Judge Posner similarly distinguished the applicability of Noerr-Pennington
immunity in abuse of process situations, arguing that Noerr-Pennington
immunity is applied too broadly in abuse of process cases.180 Though some
question the two-prong sham exception test, courts are yet to collectively
move away from this two-prong analysis and its objective baselessness
requirement. 18 1 Thus, the sham exception would likely be ineffective in
175. Id.
176. Id. at 60-61.
177. Cf Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note 1 (explaining that the lengthy review
process, court appeals, and sampling practices contribute to the unpredictability of
administrative reviews).
178. See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 67-76 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (questioning the majority's strict two-prong test); see also Grip-Pak, Inc. v.
Illinois Tool Works, 694 F.2d 466, 471-73 (7th Cir. 1983) (suggesting the use of an
abuse of process analysis to give more consideration to anticompetitive purposes in
sham situations).
179. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 74-76 (Stevens, J., concurring).
180. See Grip-Pak, Inc., 694 F.2d at 471-73 (refusing to rule that the difficulty in
distinguishing between lawful and unlawful anticompetitive purposes is so acute that
any anticompetitive purpose with the smallest basis in law can never be actionable
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
181. See Prof'1 Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 55 n.3 (1993) (observing the
multiple approaches courts of appeals have taken in determining Noerr-Pennington
immunity under its sham exception yet applying the two-prong analysis); Music Center
S.N.C. Di Luciano Pisoni & Co. v. Prestini Musical Instruments Corp., 874 F. Supp.
543, 548-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (maintaining the two prong analysis for the sham
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AD cases.182
3. The Chinese Furniture Case Raises Many of These Antitrust and
Anti-Competition Concerns
In the Chinese furniture case, the ITC recognized that the administrative
review process led to annual settlements between domestic and Chinese
producers. However, Commerce and the ITC refused to do more than
briefly comment on the settlements, leaving the question of their legality
open-ended. 184 This lack of administrative attention, however, does not
necessarily imply that these settlements do not create antitrust liability for
the domestic producers.
The domestic furniture industry's efforts to compel settlement
agreements through threats of costly administrative reviews seem to openly
infringe upon antitrust laws. With respect to the Sherman Act, these
settlements involve collusive agreements amongst multiple parties that
directly affect market price and volume conditions by artificially skewing
the assigned dumping rates and assuring an uninterrupted flow of LTFV
Chinese furniture. 18 5 On the price side, these agreements create additional
costs and distortions that can force foreign producers to raise prices.'86 On
the volume side, because the size of the settlement payments are based on
the value of each Chinese firm's imports, a system of perverse incentives
causes domestic producers to encourage more Chinese furniture imports so
they can demand higher settlement payments.'8 These perverse incentives
exception).
182. See Cho, supra note 5, at 361 (finding the sham exception to likely be
ineffective in AD cases because of courts' narrow interpretation of the exception).
183. Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 16.
184. See id at 17, n.106 (observing that the ITC is not charged with enforcing
antitrust laws); Combs, supra note 61 (reporting that Commerce, after repeated
inquiries, continues to deny knowledge of the settlement arrangements); Hagerty, supra
note 2 (quoting a Commerce spokesperson who did not approve of the settlements but
explained that Commerce lacked the appropriate authority to investigate such
agreements).
185. See Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America, supra note 128, at 1,
5-7 (describing how a subset of domestic producers worked together to create these
settlement "schemes" that enabled a continuous and substantial flow of subject imports
into the U.S. market and allowed subject Chinese producers to maintain low deposit
rates); see also Combs, supra note 61 (describing how multiple international and
domestic parties were involved in designing the settlements).
186. See Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 29 (Additional Views of Comm'r
Daniel R. Pearson) (observing that the furniture settlements imposed higher costs on
the AD process, in addition to the costs normally associated with AD investigations).
187. See Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America, supra note 128, at 7
(describing the "perverse incentives" of the settlements and how they do not serve the
purpose of AD laws). But see Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 29 n.l (Additional
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are important because the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not protect
actions used to achieve a purpose that legislation is intended to curtail, 8 9
which, in this case, is the influx of subject Chinese imports. Most courts,
however, apply Noerr-Pennington immunity regardless of the petitioning
party's subjective intent for bringing the petition.189 Thus, the exception
would be ineffective in these settlement disputes unless courts begin to
interpret the sham exception less strictly and focus more on the petitioners'
subjective intent.190
These settlement agreements further restrain trade by treating some
Chinese producers differently than others, depending on their relationships
with domestic producers.' 9' This abuse and restraint of trade carries over
into the domestic furniture industry's exploitation of the administrative
review process.192 AD orders are intended to protect U.S. producers by
limiting the volume of subject imports, but, because of these settlements,
domestic furniture producers were able to manipulate market quantities and
encourage the importation of subject Chinese furniture so they could line
their pockets with more settlement cash.193
Views of Commissioner Daniel R. Pearson) (noting that the record did not indicate a
clear connection between the settlements and the volume of subject imports).
188. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972).
189. See Assoc. Container Transp. Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 58-59 (2d Cir.
1983) (considering petitioning parties' subjective motivations to be irrelevant for
Noerr-Pennington purposes). See generally Prof'1 Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (holding that the Noerr-Pennington
sham exception does not turn on subjective intent, but instead turns on objective
reasonableness).
190. Compare Cho, supra note 5, at 361 (observing that AD petitions would likely
be protected from antitrust liability by courts' strict sham exception analyses), with
Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1982)
(applying abuse of process reasoning to a sham exception analysis so as to focus more
on the petitioners' subjective intent).
191. See Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America, supra note 128, at 63
(suggesting that some Chinese furniture firms may receive different settlement terms
because of their commercial relationships with domestic firms); Hagerty, supra note 2
(finding potential for abuse when settlements permit U.S. furniture producers to treat
Chinese producers differently because Chinese producers with more favorable
settlement terms could gain an unfair advantage in the U.S. market); see also
Posthearing Brief of Guandong Yihua Timber Industry Co., supra note 127, at 2
(explaining that AD laws and regulations fail to consider that settlement fees can vary
depending on the commercial relationship between a foreign and domestic firm).
192. See Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America, supra note 128, at 3-4
(describing domestic petitioners' use of the petitioning process as a "shakedown" of as
many Chinese producers as possible).
193. See Prehearing Brief of Guangdong Yihua Timber Industry Co., Wooden
Bedroom Furniture from China, Inv. No. 73 1-TA-1058, USITC Pub. 4203, at 11 (Dec.
2010) (Review); Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China, Inv. No. 731-TA-1058,
USITC Pub. 4203, at 29 (Dec. 2010) (Review) (contrasting the purpose of AD laws
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4. These Settlement Agreements Severely Frustrate the Object and
Purpose of U.S. Trade Laws
The primary purpose of AD orders is to protect domestic industries from
unfairly priced imports being dumped into the U.S. market.' 94 However,
when private parties agree to post-order settlement agreements without any
agency oversight, the AD orders no longer serve the purpose of the AD
laws.195 Instead of limiting the flow of subject foreign imports, these
settlements actually encourage the opposite outcome by tying the size of
settlement payments to subject import volumes. 96
Moreover, AD laws specifically describe certain distinct types of AD
settlements, but these private post-order agreements do not qualify as any
of those statutorily authorized settlement methods.'9 7 Plus, through these
settlement agreements, domestic producers manage to circumvent
Congress's intent by retrieving duty revenues from the cash settlement
payments.198
III. BY ACCOUNTING FOR POST-ORDER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS,
THE FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE OF AD LAWS CAN BE RESTORED
This Section describes several methods by which AD laws can change to
properly account for the existence of private post-order settlement
agreements. Above all, the function and purpose of U.S. AD laws need to
be restored so that domestic industries can effectively compete without the
threat of unfairly dumped goods.199
with the effects of the settlements).
194. E.g., Schnerre, supra note 7.
195. See Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 29 (Additional Views of Commissioner
Daniel R. Pearson) (believing that the settlement agreements did nothing to limit the
harmful effects of subject imports).
196. See Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America, supra note 128, at 7
(arguing that the domestic producers' use of settlement agreements to both encourage
subject imports and turn a profit violates the purpose of AD laws); see also Chinese
Furniture, supra note 2, at 29 (Additional Views of Commissioner Daniel R. Pearson)
(explaining how these settlement agreements do not benefit the domestic industry or
economy).
197. KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9; Macrory, supra note 8, at 24-26.
198. See Lester, supra note 4 (observing that, with the repeal of the Byrd
Amendment, Congress did not intend for U.S. producers to receive AD duty payments,
but they still manage to do so through these settlement agreements).
199. See Chinese Furniture, supra note 2, at 29 (Additional Views of Commissioner
Daniel R. Pearson) (elucidating how these settlement agreements do not provide the
domestic benefits that AD orders are designed, but not necessarily required, to
encourage); Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America, supra note 128, at 7
(arguing that AD settlements incentivize unfairly priced imports).
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A. Recommendation 1: Expressly Prohibit Private Post-Order Cash
Settlement Agreements Under AD Law
AD laws could be amended to expressly limit the available settlement
methods for AD cases and prohibit private post-order settlement
agreements.2 00 If private post-order settlements are expressly prohibited,
then administrative reviews would still be available, but they could not act
a means of coercing foreign industries into settlement agreements.
A domestic interested party's withdrawal of a petition for administrative
review could signal Commerce to investigate whether the withdrawal was
related to a settlement agreement. Commerce and the ITC are well-
positioned to investigate any potential post-order settlements because they
have extensive access to domestic industry information via the
questionnaires they send to domestic producers.201 Commerce and the
ITC's questionnaires could ask domestic firms if they are party to, or
otherwise aware of, any private settlement agreements. Moreover, both
Commerce and the ITC have broad powers to investigate domestic
industries' business data, so they would be well-positioned to notice
suspicious petition withdrawals. 2 02 Under this method, private post-order
settlement agreements would violate AD laws; therefore, antitrust concerns
and Noerr-Pennington immunity would not be as important.203
If Recommendation I were applied in the Chinese furniture case, once
the domestic interested parties withdrew their petitions for an
administrative review, Commerce would begin investigating whether any
domestic firms were involved in any settlement agreements with foreign
producers as part of the administrative review process.204  Commerce
would then refuse to acknowledge any withdrawals of petitions for review
that were related to collusive settlement agreements and would proceed
with those administrative reviews.
200. Cf KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9 (describing private, non-statutory methods of
settling AD administrative reviews); Macrory, supra note 8, at 24-26 (listing the
methods for settling AD cases and administrative reviews under AD laws).
201. See Cho, supra note 5, at 395 (clarifying that these questionnaires are not
optional and that the ITC and Commerce can investigate further to verify the
questionnaire responses).
202. See Schnerre, supra note 7, at 497.
203. Cf Combs, supra note 61 (admitting that Commerce and the ITC cannot
investigate antitrust violations because of jurisdiction restrictions, but they can both
investigate AD issues).
204. Cf Schnerre, supra note 7, at 497 (noting that Commerce and the ITC already
have "powerful" administrative and investigative powers).
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B. Recommendation 2: Give Commerce and the ITC Greater
Oversight Over How the Settlements Proceed
Because the administrative review process generates costly uncertainty
for both domestic and foreign producers, there are benefits to settling and
avoiding this uncertainty;205 to preserve these benefits, Congress could
change AD laws to create a standardized mechanism for settling post-order
AD agreements. By providing strict agency oversight over the settlement
process, the agencies can ensure the agreements do not frustrate the
purpose of AD laws. The statutory provisions for suspension agreements
could act as a model because they already require Commerce to determine
whether settlements are in the public interest before approving the
agreements.206
Agency oversight may also correct the perverse incentives created by the
unregulated private post-order agreements and refocus the purpose on
limiting subject imports.207 Questionnaires could again identify the
relevant domestic and foreign producers and ensure that all interested
parties included in the settlement receive equal or similar settlement
terms.208
In applying Recommendation 2, the agreements between domestic and
Chinese furniture producers would be subjected to strict agency oversight.
Before any settlement could be reached, Commerce would have to
investigate the agreement to ensure that its effects would be in the interests
of the public and the domestic industry. If the settlements do not to serve
those interests, Commerce would not allow a withdrawal of the petitions
and would proceed with the administrative review.
C. Recommendation 3: Change the Retrospective Nature ofAD Duty
Assessments
It is the retrospective liability determinations' inherent uncertainty that
205. KAYE & DUNN, supra note 9.
206. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(a)-(c); Schnerre, supra note 7, at 503.
207. See Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America, supra note 128, at 7
(arguing that the unregulated settlements incentivize subject imports); KAYE & DUNN,
supra note 9 (explaining that since these settlement agreements occur without any
agency oversight, neither the settlement process nor its terms are subject to agency
approval or public interest analysis).
208. See Posthearing Brief of Furniture Retailers of America, supra note 128, at 63
(suggesting that Chinese furniture firms receive different settlement terms because of
their commercial relationships with domestic firms); Hagerty, supra note 2 (observing
that Chinese producers with more favorable settlement terms could gain an unfair
advantage in the U.S. market).
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encourages post-order settlement agreements. 20 9  Therefore, if the
retrospective liability determination is removed, or at least reformed, the
parties will not be incentivized to circumvent statutory mechanisms.
However, the initial duty rates should not act as permanent rates for the life
of the AD order because that would enable foreign firms to freely increase
their dumping margins after an order is assigned. To avoid this, AD duties
should be adjusted through the administrative review process, but there
should be a limit as to how much the duty liability can change every year,
i.e., allow the new duty rates to fluctuate only by a certain percentage in
either direction, year-over-year. 2 10  This will prevent subject foreign
producers from raising their dumping margins after an order is
implemented, and it will reduce the foreign producers' uncertainty about
their future liability.
Under Recommendation 3, Chinese producers would have had less
incentive to agree to the domestic producers' terms because they would not
have faced such costly uncertainty about future liability. 2 1 1 Therefore, the
agreements may not have transpired in the first place, but if they had, and
either Recommendation 1 or Recommendation 2 was also in place, it would
ease the investigative burden on Commerce and the ITC because fewer
Chinese producers would likely settle.
CONCLUSION
This is a case where the overlap between two distinct, yet related, areas
of the law does not increase the laws' respective utilities; instead, the
overlap allows private actors to circumvent both. Though post-order AD
settlement agreements precisely fit the description of the types of collusive
and anticompetitive behavior that antitrust laws are designed to prevent, the
procedures and processes of trade laws make them permissible. Likewise,
these settlement agreements frustrate the object and purpose of AD laws,
but exceptions to antitrust laws prevent that frustration from being
mitigated.
Under current antitrust and AD laws, these settlement agreements are
likely legal because of the protection afforded by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine and courts' narrow application of its sham exception. Unless
209. See infra Section II.A.
210. Cf Pierce & DeFrancesco, supra note I (arguing that the lack of a "cap" on
foreign producers' exposure to AD duty liability under the administrative review
system increases the relative cost of the uncertainty faced by those foreign producers
subject to review).
211. See Ikenson, supra note 47 (reporting that domestic furniture producers
effectively enhanced threats of heightened uncertainty and higher duties by requesting
reviews of Chinese firms with relatively low AD duties).
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courts make a concerted effort to incorporate an abuse of process analysis
into Noerr-Pennington decisions, these settlements will continue until the
AD laws are changed. If the laws are not changed, domestic industries will
continue extorting their foreign competitors and lining their pockets with
cash, all while encouraging the very same unfair imports that AD laws are
supposed to curtail.
